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Peter Kivy’s latest book contains an inspiring selection of essays 
in the philosophy of music. It discusses a broad array of 
problems, including musical genius, authenticities and the 
perception of music; and relations between music and moral, 
religious, political and scientific categories, mediated by the 
concepts of meaning, representation and intention. The four 
main parts of the volume are followed by two large polemic 
appendices which contribute to the discussion of the previously 
treated issues (genius again, and the “great divide” in the history 
of the Western musical culture), thus offering a tour de force of 
impeccably clear and well-pondered argumentation. The book’s 
straightforward, sparkling and, at times, colloquial style (so 
typical of Kivy) makes it an accessible and highly rewarding 
read for a whole range of readers. It offers some significant 
critical insight into scientific research on music, including a 
detailed discussion of some recent claims made in psychology 
and musicology. 
Part I and the first Appendix deal with the problem of musical 
genius. In the opening essay, Mozart’s skull, Kivy discusses and 
defends the basic idea of genius in music (and the emblematic 
case of Mozart’s genius) against ideologically-motivated 
attempts  at its conceptual deconstruction. He maintains that it is 
not possible, nor would it be desirable to arrive at a scientific 
explanation for genius. It is the very precocity and magnitude of 
Mozart’s musical ability and achievement that daunt us, 
stimulating our curiosity but remaining an inexplicable mystery 
despite all our scientific efforts to shed light on the 
phenomenon. According to Kivy, the genius problem is 
comparable in this respect to the hard problem of consciousness. 
This is not necessarily a drawback, however, since the 
mysterious quality of Mozart's music enriches our experience of 
it. 
Kivy defends this position against some recent attempts to 
dismiss the whole issue by denying the very existence of 
geniuses by means of politically-driven “demystification” 
(T. DeNora, P. Higgins). The “post-modern genius syndrome” is 
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the fear of genius, seen as an elitist concept that presupposes a 
radical, innate inequality between human beings and provides an 
objective standard for artistic evaluation. Scholars prone to this 
“syndrome” claim that “all geniuses are politically constructed” 
(p.15), and so is our experience of their works. Kivy’s refutation 
of these claims appeals to the “experience of the transcendent 
beauty of Mozart’s music” (ibid.). He argues that it is 
inconceivable to accept the political deconstruction theory and 
still have this sort of experience. 
The miniature Case of the purloined partitur compares three 
parallel stories concerning the early musical education of 
G. Ph. Telemann, G. F. Handel and J. S. Bach. They all follow 
the same “plot archetype” (p.27), namely that of the 
Wunderkind’s disobedience and perseverance in his approach to 
music despite the disapproval of his elders. In Bach’s case this 
narrative pattern prevails over the biographical facts; it is part of 
the genius mythography. “But genius is not a myth – concludes 
Kivy. – It is the fact that the myths are about” (p.30). 
Appendix I contains a detailed response to J.O. Young’s 
vigorous criticism of Kivy’s account of musical genius and how 
it was shaped by the philosophical elaboration of the concept of 
genius in Kant and Schopenhauer, following two ancient 
paradigms: Longinian (for Handel and Beethoven) and Platonic 
(for Mozart). Kivy rejects all of Young’s critical claims and 
interprets the historical examples of usage of the term “genius” 
prior to Handel as mere footnotes to what he likes to call the 
“grand narrative” on the modern concept of musical genius. 
Part II contains three essays on musical Authenticities, a subject 
already treated at length by the author in the book of that name. 
Kivy thinks of musical authenticity necessarily in the plural, 
primarily because he distinguishes the authenticity of 
performance from that of understanding and appreciation. 
Secondly, this is because the historical authenticity of 
performance can be understood in three ways: as 1. intention, 
i.e.  the realisation  “of the composer’s intentions with regard to 
how the particular work in question should be performed” 
(p.91); as 2. sound, i.e. the reproduction of the sounds that an 
audience contemporary with the composer would have heard; 
and as 3. practice, i.e. the performing of a piece in the way 
music was played in the composer’s time and milieu. This is a 
wholly conceptual distinction, since it is perfectly feasible for 
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conditions 1, 2.1 (cf. infra) and 3 to coincide in the same 
performance. 
In more detail, Kivy further divides authenticity as sound (2), 
depending on whether it is meant as a purely physical (acoustic) 
phenomenon or as an intentional (heard-as) object, into 2.1 sonic 
and 2.2 sensible authenticity. This is a crucial point because the 
musical sensibility of a concert-goer of today arguably differs 
from the pre-Wagnerian and pre-tonal listener’s sensibilities. 
The same acoustic phenomenon of minor sixth or third heard by 
modern-day ears is a consonance, but this was not so for a pre-
classical listener etc. The mere reproduction of the sonic 
structure might therefore not be sufficient today, nor even 
necessary, to achieve the sensible effect that it had on an 
audience around 1600 or 1400. Instead, in the words of Arthur 
Danto cited by Kivy, to attain such a sensible authenticity (in 
some cases at least) “we must ‘elicit equivalent experiences 
through inequivalent stimuli’”(p.92). 
Kivy uses these basic distinctions to elucidate various problems 
and tensions underlying the widespread historically informed 
performance movement, and to argue as well against the “new 
criticism” in musicology (S. McClary). His argument is roughly  
that if you accept the death of the author thesis (R. Barthes, 
S. Fish) applied to music, namely that the composer’s authority 
over his work’s meaning fails to hold, then you have no rational 
grounds for concerning yourself with the author’s  intentions 
regarding the music’s performance. But, according to Kivy, this 
is the only possible justification for any historically authentic 
performance (p.63). Therefore, either one of the pillars of 
modern historical musicology is unfounded, or the “intentional 
fallacy” argument cited by the proponents of the “new criticism” 
in order to attribute sexual and political content to works of 
absolute music is invalid. 
Opera is music, it is drama-made-music (and not the other way 
round, despite the attempts of the Camerata fiorentina to make 
opera dramma per musica). Kivy points out that the quality of 
the music (not of the libretto) is the only criterion used to 
position an operatic work in the repertoire. Also, while it is 
common practice to present concert versions or orchestral 
transcriptions of operas, it would be hard to imagine a stage 
version of an opera without any music. He says that the musical 
setting for conversational speech essential to opera makes of it 
“perfect musical form and perfect conversational nonsense” 
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(p.95), considering the radically different pace of speech and 
singing, and because of the frequent patterns of repetition (e.g. 
Da Capo aria) needed in a closed musical form, but clearly 
foreign to the nature of conversation. The author claims that the 
original verbal layer of an opera is a part of its musical text and 
therefore the practice of staging Italian opera in English (vide: 
English National Opera) can be criticised not just because it is 
historically inauthentic, but also and more importantly because it 
fails to perform the opera at all.  
Part III includes four variegated essays on meaning and 
representation in music. The first two examine questions deeply 
rooted in the more general problem. Can we speak of the 
meaning of a work of music in terms that would justify an 
epistemic and moral assessment of that meaning? If so, under 
what conditions? Would such an assessment be relevant to the 
work’s artistic value? In Messiah’s message Kivy argues against 
one musicologist’s claim that Handel’s oratorio “was designed 
to teach contempt for Jews and Judaism” (M. Marissen cit. in 
p.114). He takes the position that morality and immorality, truth 
and falsity can be attributed to works of art, and that these 
qualities are their artistic virtues and defects, respectively. As to 
Messiah, in particular, Kivy exculpates Handel of anti-
Semitism, though he still blames him for the artistic defect of 
having falsely represented the Jews. In the same manner, to a 
convinced atheist, the oratorio (like any other piece of sacred 
music) has the general demerit of projecting the theistic world 
view.  
This very problem comes under scrutiny in the second essay, 
Is nothing sacred? Can an atheist fully appreciate a religious 
work of art? Kivy advances a Jamesian distinction between  live 
and dead hypotheses that, when applied to their attitude to the 
religious message, respectively characterise the non-aggressive 
and the dogmatic atheist. It is not a matter of whether or not we 
share the religious faith implicit in a work of music that makes 
us appreciate it to the full, but whether or not we still see said 
faith as a live hypothesis. The dogmatic atheist’s appreciation of 
sacred music is therefore somewhat diminished, but the same 
does not apply to the non-aggressive atheist. Any “humanistic” 
interpretation of religious art offering a naturalised, symbolic, 
psychoanalytic or other reduction of an artwork’s theistic 
content should be dismissed as a misinterpretation. For “when 
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you change the work’s meaning you are ipso facto turning it into 
a different work” (p.139). 
In his Sound in sound essay, Kivy explores the category of sonic 
representation in 18th-century music, citing examples from 
Handel’s Saul and Mozart’s Don Giovanni. He recalls 
E.T. Cone’s distinction between “realistic song” and “operatic 
song” to construe a parallel category for instrumental music, 
where by “realistic music” he means the “representation of 
music in music” (p.149). Kivy responds to some objections to 
the pictorial representation of music in music advanced by 
R. Scruton, J. Robinson and S. Davies. 
In Music, science and semantics the author offers a severe 
methodological criticism of some recent attempts (A. Patel) to 
probe musical meaning by means of experimental psychology. 
Contrary to what the cover note says, Part IV contains two 
essays. In Authorial intention and the musical parameters Kivy 
argues against the apparently plausible dualism of the intention-
bound content and the pure musical parameters of a 
composition, that some consider to be independent of intention. 
All such musical devices as cadenza, imitation, modulation etc., 
are authorial-intention-relative; no function can be attributed to 
pure sound structures if not on the grounds of the composer’s 
presumed intention. 
The closing essay, Leonard Meyer’s sonata, is a rare and 
intriguing example of what we might be tempted to call the 
music of philosophy, albeit only as a roughly-sketched outline. It 
interprets Meyer’s thought in its entirety as a two-theme sonata 
movement. Furthermore, this interpretative metaphor is 
presented in a literary form that intentionally evokes sonata-
form structure and leads the reader through it. 
Sounding off  is a book whose author does not hesitate to make 
audacious claims. Some of them, like “operas in general are not 
about anything” (p.105), are striking, but convincing too. 
Others, like Kivy’s authorial-intention-focused analysis of an 
artwork’s meaning as if it were a kind of utterance, leave ample 
room for doubt. Some of the empirical premises for the author’s 
philosophical reasoning warrant scrutiny (as, I believe, in the 
case of Operatic authenticity, as far as Europe’s stages are 
concerned at least). These and other potentially debatable points, 
however, by virtue of the author’s much-praised merits of clear 
style and argumentation, make the book even more valuable as a 
stimulus for further discussion and research. 
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